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COMMENT 
INNOCENCE AND INCARCERATION: A COMPREHENSIVE 
REVIEW OF MARYLAND'S POSTCONVICTION DNA 
RELIEF STATUTE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
IMPROVEMENT 
By: Nicholas Phillips' 
1. INTRODUCTION 
I n 1989 Gary Dotson became the first person in the United States to be exonerated of his crime through the use of DNA technology.l After 
being convicted in 1979 of rape and aggravated kidnapping, Dotson was -
cleared after DNA testing conclusively proved that spermatozoa found on 
the alleged victim's underwear could not have come from Dotson, but 
may have come from the victim's boyfriend at the time. 2 In light of the 
uncovered evidence, the State's Attorney's Office declined to retry the 
case.3 Since then, 272 other names have been cleared after testing of 
biological evidence either established their innocence or seriously 
undermined the validity of their conviction.4 While criminal convictions 
carry a presumption of validity, 5 DNA technology conclusively identifies 
• J.D. Candidate, 2012. I would like to thank the staff of the University of Baltimore 
Law Forum for all of their hard work. 1 would also like to thank my faculty advisor, Professor 
Byron L. Warnken, for his assistance and wisdom. Finally, a special thanks to my parents, 
Andrew and Teresa, and the rest of my family and friends for their support, encouragement, 
and confidence in me throughout law school. 
I Gary Dotson, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.orgl 
ContentlGary_Dotson.php (last visited Oct. 19,2011). While Dotson was released in August 
1989, the conviction of David Vasquez for murder was reversed in January 1989. David 
Vasquez, MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.exonerate.orglother-Iocal-
victories/david-vasquez! (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). However, Vasquez was exonerated after 
the police and FBI tested evidence in similar crimes because DNA testing of evidence used to 
convict Vasquez proved inconclusive. David Vasquez, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.orgiContentlDavid_ Vasquez.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). The 
distinction between Vasquez and Dotson is that Vasquez was cleared after law enforcement 
officials conclusively linked to the already committed Timothy Spencer, also known as the 
South Side Strangler, crimes carried out in the exact same fashion as the crime thought to have 
been committed by Vasquez. David Vasquez, MID-ATLANTIC INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.exonerate.orglother-Iocal-victories/david-vasquezl; http://www.exonerate.orgl 
other-Iocal-victories/david-vasquezl (last visited Oct. 19,2011). 
2 /d. 
3 /d. 
4 Innocence Project Case Profiles, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocence 
project.orglknow/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2011). 
5 Loper v. Beto, 405 U.S. 473, 499 (1972) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Johnson 
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 468-69 (1938)). 
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individuals and makes it possible, in certain circumstances, to exonerate 
an individual who was wrongfully convicted of a crime.6 
In 1993 Kirk Bloodsworth became the first death row inmate to be 
exonerated by postconviction DNA testing.7 Bloodsworth was convicted 
eight years earlier in Baltimore County, Maryland of killing and sexually 
assaulting a nine-year-old girl.8 DNA evidence collected from the crime 
scene eventually proved that Bloodsworth did not commit the crime.9 As 
a result, Bloodsworth's exoneration generated significant media attention 
and public interest about the death penalty and wrongful convictions, 
especially in Maryland. 10 
Because of its proven reliability, DNA evidence is now admissible in 
all trial courts in the United States. ll Shortly after DNA testing proved 
reliable, states began enacting postconviction relief statutes specifically to 
aid inmates in proving their innocence through DNA analysis. In 1994 
New York enacted the nation's first postconviction DNA testing statute. 12 
By 2004 the federal government and thirty-two states, including 
Maryland, enacted statutes providing for postconviction DNA relief. 13 
Today almost every jurisdiction in the United States allows criminals to 
challenge the factual validity of their convictions through DNA testing. 14 
In Maryland, there are numerous limitations on the accessibility and 
scope of postconviction DNA relief. While Maryland law provides relief 
under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act, and other similar 
6 NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HANDLING REQUESTS 2 (1999), 
available at https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnij/177626.pdf [hereinafter FUTURE OF DNA 
EVIDENCE]. While DNA can help to free the falsely convicted, prosecutors can also use DNA 
to establish the guilt of the accused at trial. Id. 
7 Kirk Bloodsworth, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/ 
Kirk Bloodsworth.php (last visited Oct. 19,2011). 
8" Id. On appeal, Bloodsworth's conviction was reversed and remanded and he was 
subsequently sentenced to two consecutive life sentences. Id.; see also Bloodsworth v. State, 
307 Md. 164,512 A.2d 1056 (1986), remanded to 76 Md. App. 23, 543 A.2d 382 (1988), cert. 
denied, 313 Md. 688, 548 A.2d 128 (1988). 
9 Bloodsworth, supra note 7. Genetic material found on the victim's undergarments, 
presumed to belong to the assailant, revealed spermatozoa that did not match Bloodsworth's 
DNA profile. Id. 
10 See Rob Hiassen, The Second Life of Kirk Bloodsworth, THE BALTIMORE SUN, June 30, 
2000, http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/marylandibal-profile07300 0,0,2351215.story. 
II FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at I. While there is a common misconception 
that DNA technology identifies a particular individual, DNA testing works to exclude 
individuals based on a comparison to the original source. ld. at 21. 
12 Blake v. State (Blake /),395 Md. 213, 219, 909 A.2d 1020,1023 (2006) (citing N.Y. 
CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.30(I-a) (McKinney 2006». 
13 Blake 1, 395 Md. at 218, 909 A.2d at 1023 n. 4. 
14 Nancy Ritter, Postconviction DNA Testing Is at Core of Major NIl Initiatives, 262 NIJ 
J. 18, 19 (2009), https:llwww.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesllnijl225758.pdf. 
2011] Innocence and Incarceration 67 
statutes,15 weaknesses in section 8-201 tend to limit its usefulness to 
inmates who are actually innocent. 16 At the same time, such deficiencies 
could theoretically lead to the release of an inmate who is factually guilty 
of the crime for which he was convicted, but is nevertheless able to seek 
relief by this statute. 17 Part II of this paper will survey Maryland's 
Postconviction DNA Relief statute and discuss the decisions by the 
Maryland appellate courts relating to section 8-20l. In Part III, similar 
statutes allowing postconviction relief through DNA testing will be 
evaluated to provide a broader context of the state of the law as it relates 
to DNA testing and its relevance to the postconviction process. Part IV 
will give a more detailed analysis of the Maryland statute, and will 
identify portions of the statutory scheme that may be improved. 
II. MARYLAND'S POSTCONVICTION DNA RELIEF STATUTE 
A. Filing the Petition 
Pursuant to Maryland law,- persons convicted of murder, 
manslaughter, rape, or a sexual offense ls may file a petition for DNA 
testing of biological evidence '9 related to their conviction,20 or for a law 
enforcement database search to identify the source of tested physical 
evidence?1 The petition must indicate where the charging document was 
filed, the date and location of trial, the offenses for which the petitioner 
15 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-20I(b) (West 2009). An inmate may file a petition 
for DNA testing "[nJotwithstanding any other law governing postconviction relief' which 
would include appeals filed under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act. See generally 
CRIM. PROC. §§ 7-101 to 109. Inmates may also seek to prove their innocence via a petition 
for writ of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. CRIM. PROC. § 8-301. 
Unlike a postconviction DNA relief petition, a petition for writ of actual innocence allows the 
introduction of new evidence unavailable at the time of the trial. Jd. Additionally, section 8-
30 I allows the court to set aside a verdict, resentence, grant a new trial, or correct a sentence. 
Jd.; see also CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (limiting remedy to a new trial). 
16 See discussion infra Part IV. 
17 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
18 CRIM. PROC., § 8-201(b) (specifically limiting offenses for which DNA testing is 
permitted); see generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 2-201, 2-204, 2-207, 3-303-06 
(West 2011). 
19 CRIM. PROC. § 8-20I(a)(2) ("[bJiological evidence includes but is not strictly limited 
to, blood, hair, saliva, semen, epithelial cells, buccal cells, or other bodily substances from 
which genetic marker groupings may be obtained."). 
20 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(l). The petition must be filed in the circuit court where the 
charging document was filed. MD. R. 4-703(b). 
21 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(2). For example, a court may order a DNA databank search 
when an apprehended criminal used a similar modus operandi as allegedly used by the 
petitioner. Upon an order being granted, a "cold hit" may appear in the system, thus linking 
the unknown crime scene DNA to a DNA profile of another individual already in a DNA 
database. ld. 
68 University of Baltimore Law Forum [Vol. 42.1 
was convicted, and the sentence imposed.22 Further, it must also describe 
with particularity all previous proceedings, including appeals, motions, 
postconvictions, and other collateral proceedings.23 Lastly, the petition 
must also contain a description of the evidence the petitioner wishes to 
have tested24 and how such evidence is factually related to the petitioner's 
claim of innocence.25 In sum, the petitioner needs to describe the factual 
basis for the claim that the State has custody of the evidence or that it 
could be acquired from a third party by court order, a description of how 
the evidence relates to the conviction, and that a reasonable probability 
exists that testing may provide exculpatory or mitigating evidence 
relevant to the wrongful conviction or sentencing.26 The court may also 
grant a motion to withdraw the petition.27 After the petitioner files the 
motion, the clerk of court must send copies to the State's Attorney, 
county administrative judge, and if the petitioner claims they are indigent, 
the Office of the Public Defender?8 
Upon receipt of the petition, the State's Attorney must either file an 
answer to the petition or a motion to transfer due to improper venue. 29 
The answer must first address whether the evidence sought by the 
petitioner exists and is appropriate for DNA testing.3o If the State 
contends that the evidence cannot be located, it must indicate what efforts 
were made to locate the evidence, including locations that were searched, 
the search procedure, and the names and business addresses of 
22 MD. R. 4-704(a)(1 )(8). Petitions may be amended to the extent that they serve the 
interest of justice. MD. R. § 4-704(b). 
23 MD. R. 4-704(a)(1)(C). This includes the location and case number of each 
proceeding as well as the dates of decisions and determinations made during each proceeding. 
Id. A statement must also be made about whether the petitioner is able to pay the cost of 
testing and hire counsel. MD. R. 4-704(a)(1)(D). If indigent, the petitioner may request that 
the court appoint counsel. /d. 
24 MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(A); see also Simms v. State, 409 Md. 722, 972 A.2d 1012 (2009) 
(petition sufficiently described items to be tested when it alleged that jacket, shoes, pants, belt 
and socks collected from crime scene may produce exculpatory evidence). 
25 MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(8). 
26 /d. If known, the petitioner must also state the type of DNA testing desired and a 
statement of how such testing is generally accepted by the scientific community. MD. R. 4-
704(a)(2)(C). 
27 MD. R. 4-704(c). The withdrawal shall be without prejudice if filed before DNA 
testing is ordered, and if an order has been issued, the withdrawal shall be with prejudice 
unless the court orders otherwise after finding good cause. !d. 
28 MD. R. 4-705. If the evidence is not suitable for DNA testing, the State must give the 
reasons why. MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(A). 
29 MD. R. 4-706(a). A motion to transfer venue must be filed within 30 days of the 
receipt of the petition. MD. R. 4-706(b)(1). An answer must be filed within 60 days of receipt 
of the petition or within 60 days after the denial of a motion to transfer venue. MD. R. 4-
706(c)(I). 
30 MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(A). 
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individuals involved in search efforts. 3 1 If the State contends that the 
evidence has been destroyed, it is required to describe the legal 
requirements regarding the destruction of such evidence and whether the 
appropriate protocols were followed. 32 Additionally, the answer must 
either supply documentation, if it exists, stating that evidence relevant to 
the claim of innocence was properly destroyed, or state the reasons for 
noncompliance.33 Finally, the answer must respond to every allegation 
contained in the petition.34 After considering the State's answer, the court 
can deny the petition if it finds either that the petitioner has no standing to 
make the claim or the facts alleged do not entitle the petitioner to any 
relief.35 A petitioner has the option of filing a response to challenge the 
sufficiency or accuracy of the answer or to amend the petition itself. 36 
Until 2009, a petitioner in Maryland filing a motion for postconviction 
DNA testing did not have a right to the assistance of counsel.3? Looking 
to the United States Constitution, the Supreme Court has held that there is 
no right to counsel in collateral attacks on criminal convictions.38 While 
the Maryland Constitution does not guarantee any right to counsel for 
collateral attacks,39 the Court of Appeals of Maryland indicated that if a 
provision guaranteeing a right to counsel was enacted by the Maryland 
31 MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(B). 
32 MD. R. 4-706(c)(2)(C). 
33 1d. 
34 MD. R. 4-706( c )(2)(D). 
35 MD. R. 4-707(a). However, once a petItioner presents a prima facie case of 
entitlement to relief, the court may not summarily deny the petition without a hearing. Simms 
v. State, 409 Md. 722, 731,976 A.2d 1012, 1018 (2009). In one case, sufficient facts were 
alleged when petitioner, after being convicted of murder, claimed bloody clothing at crime 
scene collected from crime scene, believed to be that of the assailant would not have any of 
his DNA on them. ld. at 733, 976 A.2d at 1019; see also Gregg v. State, 409 Md. 698, 719-
20, 976 A.2d 999, 1011 (2009) (where the petitioner alleged prima facie case when, after 
being convicted of murder, that epithelial cells found on the gun's trigger would not contain 
his DNA). 
36 MD. R. 4-708. This provision also states that the petitioner may request, after filing a 
petition under section 8-201(b)(2) of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article, a broader 
search of DNA databases if the purpose is to identifY the source of physical evidence which 
was used for DNA testing. Jd 
37 See Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 508, 929 A.2d 501, 511 (2007); Blake l, 395 Md. at 
234-37,909 A.2d at 1032-34. 
38 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) ("[A defendant] has no such 
right [to counsel] when attacking, in postconviction proceedings, a conviction that has long 
since become final upon exhaustion of the appellate process."). 
39 See Blake 1, 395 Md. at 235, 909 A.2d at 1033. Article 21 of the Maryland 
Declaration of Rights, which operates as the functional equivalent to the right to counsel 
found in the 6th Amendment to the United States Constitution, is interpreted in pari materia 
with the 6th Amendment, and is not interpreted any broader for the purpose of providing 
counsel after a direct appeal. E.g., Lodowski v. State, 307 Md. 233, 245-46, 513 A.2d 299, 
306 (1986). 
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Legislature, it would be upheld.40 As of 2009, a court must appoint 
counsel to the petitioner if the motion is not denied unless counsel for the 
petitioner has already entered his or her appearance. 41 As a result, first 
time petitioners for postconviction relief have a statutory right to 
counse1.42 
B. The Hearing Stage 
The court must hold a htaring on the petition if it determines the 
petitioner has standing and finds any of the following factors: (1) that the 
evidence related to a judgment of conviction exists and there is, or may 
be; a reasonable probability that DNA testing may produce exculpatory 
evidence related to conviction or sentencing; (2) the State contends that 
the evidence cannot be located and a genuine dispute exists as to whether 
the search was adequate43 ; (3) the State contends that the evidence was 
destroyed and a genuine dispute exists as to whether the destruction 
conformed to protocol or was lawful; or (4) the State is unable to produce 
evidence it was required to preserve under section 8-201(i)(1).44 When 
the State alleges that the evidence requested for testing no longer exists or 
cannot be found, a petitioner must be given an opportunity to respond to 
the State's assertion45 for reasons of fundamental faimess.46 
40 See Blake I, 395 Md. at 235, 909 A.2d at 1033 ("Any right to counsel appellant may 
have under the DNA testing statute must be found in [section] 8-201 [of the Maryland 
Criminal Procedure article]."). 
41 MD. R. 4-707(b). Counsel must be appointed within 30 days after the State files its 
answer. Id. 
42 CRIM. PROC. § 7-108(a). If a postconviction proceeding is reopened under section 7-
104, whether the petitioner is provided with counsel is left to the discretion of the court. Id. 
Thus, the petitioner would be guaranteed a lawyer only if a postconviction proceeding is 
opened for the first time upon favorable DNA results. 
43 See Blake v. State (Blake II), 418 Md. 445,462, 15 A.3d 787, 797 (201 I) (hiring 
outside company to perform search of police evidence unit and State's Attorney's Office 
sufficient to satisfy State's search burden); Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1, 15,985 A.2d 540, 548 
(2009) (search efforts insufficient when, after some investigation, the petitioner narrowly 
tailors particular areas where a search should be continued); Arey, 400 Md. at 503, 929 A.2d 
at 508 (search of evidence control unit insufficient to show that evidence doesn't exist); Blake 
1, 395 Md. at 227, 909 A.2d at 1028 (memorandum from evidence clerk stating that property 
did not exist insufficient to show nonexistence). The burden is on the State to establish that 
the evidence in question no longer exists. Id. 
44 MD. R. 4-709(a); see also Gregg, 409 Md. at 721, 976 A.2d at 1012 (once a prima 
facie showing of entitlement to relief is shown, the trial court lacks discretion to deny a 
hearing, appellant made prima facie case after alleging that epithelial cells found on trigger of 
firearm used in homicide would not match his DNA, showing that he did not fire it). The 
hearing must be held within 90 days after service of response to the State's answer or within 
120 days after service of the State's answer if no response is filed. MD. R. 4-709(d). For 
discussion about evidence requiring preservation, see infra notes 66, 67 and accompanying 
text. 
45 Arey, 400 Md. at 505, 929 A.2d at 509; Blake 1, 395 Md. at 222, 909 A.2d at 1025. 
46 Blake I, 395 Md. at 228, 909 A.2d at 1028. 
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Additionally, the Court mandates the guarantee of a hearing, as the 
guarantee exists for other dispositive motion hearings in criminal and 
civil cases.47 Further, due process considerations tend to support the 
argument that a hearing is necessary and allowing a hearing is the 
practice of other jurisdictions.48 During the hearing, the burden is on the 
state to prove that the evidence in question is missing or no longer 
exists.49 In Blake I, an unsworn memorandum from the officer in charge 
of evidence control, stating that the evidence from the case could not be 
located, was insufficient to show that evidence in question does not 
exist.50 
No hearing is required if the petitioner either lacks standing or if the 
facts alleged do not entitle the petitioner to relief as a matter of law. 51 A 
court may also elect to hold a hearing in its discretion even if one is not 
required.52 Further, a court may also grant the petition and order DNA 
testing without a hearing if there is a written agreement between the 
petitioner and the State's Attorney.53 The court must deny the petition, 
after conducting a hearing, if it finds that an adequate search was 
conducted, the evidence in question does not exist, and that the State did 
not willfully destroy evidence it was not required to preserve.54 
Alternatively, the petition must be denied if the method of testing 
requested by the petitioner is not generally accepted or if there is no 
reasonable probability that DNA testing would produce exculpatory or 
47 1d. at 228-32, 909 A.2d at 1028-29. In civil cases, court cannot grant motion for 
judgment notwithstanding a verdict, motion for a new trial, motion to amend a judgment, or 
other dispositive motion without a hearing if a party so requests. MD. R. 2-311(e) and (t). A 
hearing is also required for petitions filed under the Uniform Postconviction Procedure Act. 
MD. R. 4-406. 
48 Blake 1,395 Md. at 228-32, 909 A.2d at 1028-31. 
49 1d. at 227, 232, 909 A.2d at 1028, 1031. No mention is made, however, of exactly 
what the State's burden is. See id. at 227,909 A.2d at 1028. Because scientific evidence must 
be preserved under section 8-201(j) of the Maryland Criminal Procedure Article, there is a 
presumption that the evidence exists and is in the states control. See Blake 1, 395 Md. at 223, 
909 A.2d at 1026. Prosecutors should be hesitant to hastily conclude that evidence does not 
exist because evidence may be found in many different places like the prosecutors office, state 
and local crime laboratories, hospitals and clinics, defense investigators, courthouse evidence 
rooms, offices of defense counsel, independent crime laboratories, clerks of court, and court 
reporters. 1d. at 221-23,909 A.2d at .1024-25 (citing FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 
6, at 36,46). 
50 Blake 1, 395 Md. at 227, 909 A.2d at 1028. 
51 MD. R. 4-709(b)(1). If the court does not hold a hearing, the judge must issue a 
written order citing the reasons why a hearing is not required. MD. R. 4-709(e). 
52 MD. R. 4-709(c). 
53 MD. R. 4-709(b )(2). The court must approve the stipulation, and testing must still be 
conducted under the provisions of Maryland Rule 4-71O(a)(2)(B). MD. R. 4-709(b )(2). 
54 MD. R. 4-710(a)(I)(A). 
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mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 
sentencing. 55 
C. Testing of Forensic Evidence 
DNA testing must be ordered if the court finds that identification 
evidence related to a judgment of conviction exists and there is a 
reasonable probability56 that the requested testing may produce 
exculpatory or mitigating evidence related to conviction or sentencing. 57 
The order must contain a description of the evidence to be tested, the 
laboratory where testing will be performed58, and the method of testing to 
be utilized.59 The location of testing is especially likely to be litigated, as 
the cost of testing varies considerably among crime labs. 60 The order 
must also address the payment for the cost oftesting.61 
The method of testing selected by the court must be generally accepted 
within the scientific community.62 The two most prevalent types of DNA 
analyses used ill the scientific setting, RFLP testing63 
55 MD. R. 4-710(a)(I)(B). 
56 Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664, 683, 985 A.2d 32, 43 (2009). Reasonable 
probability is defined as "a probability sufficient to undennine confidence in the outcome [of 
a trial]." Wilson v. State, 363 Md. 333, 347, 768 A.2d 675,682 (2001) (citing U.S. v. Bagley, 
473 U.S. 667,682 (1985». 
57 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(1); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(A). 
58 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f); MD. R. 4-7\O(a)(2)(B)(i). If the parties cannot agree where 
the DNA testing will be done, the court may designate testing at any laboratory accredited by 
the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, the Laboratory Accreditation Board, or 
the National Forensic Science Technology Center. CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(t)(4); MD. R. 4-
71O(a)(2)(B)(i)(c). 
59 Compare CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(t), with MD. R. 4-710(a)(2)(B)(i)(a)-(c). There is an 
apparent discrepancy between the Maryland Criminal Procedure article and the Maryland 
Rules as to whether these provisions in the court's order for testing are mandatory or 
discretionary. A court in all practicality should be required to order these provisions as they 
are the sort of nuances the State and the petitioner may quibble over. 
60 OFFICE OF STATE BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, COST STUDY OF DNA TESTING AND 
ANALYSIS, 8 (2006), available at http://www.osbm.state.nc.uS/files/pdCfiles/3-1-2006Final 
DNAReport.pdf. At a public crime lab, the test can cost anywhere from $350 to $1,800. ld. at 
8. The North Carolina study found that DNA analysis at private crime labs cost anywhere 
from $445 to $1,200, but that costs only includes laboratory work. ld. at 7. Costs for expert 
testimony can be up to $2,000 per day plus travel expenses. Jd. 
61 Compare CRlM. PROC. § 8-201(h) (stating that the petitioner must initially pay for the 
testing and if the results are favorable to the petitioner, the court must order the State to pay 
for the cost of testing), with MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(i)(e) (only requiring that the order for 
testing contain a provision concerning payment for testing and could be interpreted to mean 
that a judge may order the state to pay the initial cost of testing). 
62 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d)(2); Md. R. 4-710(a)(I)(b). 
63 Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism Testing works by isolating DNA from 
biological samples and cutting them into smaller fragments using a restriction enzyme. 
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 26-27. The smaller fragments are then organized 
by length where discrete locations of the human genome are then visualized as bands on film. 
Jd. at 27. This test was developed in 1994 and has been used in many exonerations but 
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and PCR testing64, have been accepted by the courts. The court, in its 
discretion, may order the preservation of a sample of material for further 
testing and analysis at a later date.65 The Court of Appeals of Maryland 
has also held that a hearing court lacks the power to order exclusion of 
the same samples from further testing. 66 The court may also order the 
release of biological evidence held by a third party. 67 Finally, the court 
may make any other order it deems appropriate. 68 
D. Review After Testing 
After testing is completed, if the result of the DNA test or database 
search is unfavorable to the petitioner, namely, "if the test results fail to 
produce eXCUlpatory or mitigating evidence [regarding] wrongful 
conviction or sentencing," the petition is dismissed. 69 However, if the 
test results are favorable to the petitioner70, the court may order the 
opening or reopening of a postconviction proceeding. 7 I It is important to 
note that the Court of Appeals has held that a petitioner cannot lose the 
requires a minimum of 100,000 cells that are not degraded and thus many small samples will 
not be suitable for RFLP testing. ld. at 26-27. 
64 Nuclear Polymerase Chain Reaction Testing works by utilizing an enzyme to amplify, 
or copy, specific regions ofa DNA sample from within a cell's nucleus. ld. at 27. While this 
test has been used in criminal matters, it is not as discriminating as other forms of testing. See 
DNA Fingerprinting Methods, http://www.fingerprinting.comldna-fingerprinting-methods.php 
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011). PCR testing can also be used to draw a DNA profile from a cell's 
mitochondria. FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 28. Mitochondrial testing is most 
often used when there is a very small sample to be analyzed, such as dried bones or teeth, or 
when the sample is too degraded for Nuclear PCR testing. Id. 
65 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f)(3); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(ii)(b); Thompson v. State 395 Md. 
240, 909 A.2d 1035 (2006). The court does need to first find that there is sufficient DNA 
material to preserve due to the possibility that there will only be enough genetic material for a 
single test ld. at 250-51,909 A.2d at 1042. Provisions guaranteeing that enough samples are 
preserved for possible future testing are important as the advancement of science may make 
testing possible in the future using a new testing technique or mechanism which was not 
available at the time the petition was filed. 
66 Thompson, 395 Md. at 259,909 A.2d at 1047. 
67 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f)(5); MD. R. 4-710(a)(2)(B)(ii)(a). Scientific evidence may not 
always be in the custody of the state. It is certainly possible that evidence may be located, for 
example, in a hospital or medical facility or even with the victim or victim's family. 
Compelling the release of such potential evidence may be difficult without obtaining a court 
order. See Horton v. State, 412 Md. I, 10,985 A.2d 540,545 (hospital refused, citing patient 
confidentiality, to release slide of pap smear taken from rape victim). 
68 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(f); MD. R. 4-71O(a)(2)(B)(ii)(c); Horton, 412 Md. at 4,985 A.2d 
at 542. 
69 MD. R. 4-711(a); accord CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (i)(I). 
70 The standard of "favorable to petitioner" logically includes any test result in which the 
DNA subject to testing does not conclusively match the DNA profile of the petitioner. 
71 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(2)(i)-(ii); MD. R. 4-711(b)(I)(A)-(C). The petitioner being 
granted a postconviction hearing would most likely then challenge that the conviction is 
subject to collateral attack on grounds traditionally available under a writ of habeas corpus. 
CRIM.PROC. §§ 7-102(a)(4), 7-102(b). 
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right to argue DNA testing by failing to raise it as an issue in another 
postconviction proceeding.72 In the event that the results of the DNA 
testing show a substantial possibility that the petitioner would not have 
been convicted if the DNA results were revealed to the trier of fact, the 
court may order a new trial in lieu of a postconviction proceeding. 73 The 
hearing court may also order a new trial when a substantial possibility of 
innocence based on the testing does not result, but, instead, a new trial is 
warranted in the interests of justice.74 If the court elects to grant the 
petitioner a new trial, the court in its discretion may order release of the 
petitioner from incarceration prior to trial. 75 The release may be 
conditioned on bond or other conditions that reasonably assure the 
appearance of the petitioner at trial. 76 
E. Preserving Scientific Evidence 
Apart from the provisions regarding the process for testing scientific 
evidence, Maryland's statute also requires the preservation of scientific 
evidence that the State has reason to know contains genetic material and 
is kept in connection with an offense for which a petitioner can seek relief 
under this statute.77 Such evidence must be kept during the time for 
which an inmate is sentenced.78 The length of sentence also includes 
consecutive sentences imposed for other offenses for which the defendant 
was found guilty. 79 If the State is unable to produce items for testing 
upon request, the court must hold a hearing to determine whether the 
destruction of the evidence was willful or intentional. 80 If the court 
determines that the failure to produce the evidence for testing was the 
72 Arrington v. State, 411 Md. 524,545,983 A.2d 1071, 1082 (2009). 
73 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(2)(iii); MD. R. 4-71 1 (b)(l)(D); Arrington, 411 Md. at 552, 555 
983 A.2d at 1087, 1089 (petitioner awarded a new trial where state argued victim's blood was 
on petitioner's pants after a stabbing-a fact later proved to be false). 
74 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(3); MD. R. 4-71 1 (b)(2). 
75 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(i)(4); MD. R. 4-71 1 (b)(3). 
76 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (i)(4); MD. R. 4-71 1 (b)(3). 
77 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201U)(l); Horton v. State, 412 Md. 1,5,985 A.2d 540, 542 (2009). 
The offenses for which petitioner may seek relief are limited to murder, manslaughter, and 
various sex offenses. See supra notes 18, 19 and accompanying text. Many other states have 
similar provisions that require states to retain evidence that has scientific value. E.g., ARIz. 
REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4221 (West Supp. 2008); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11(4) (West Supp. 
2009); MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN § 770.l6(c)(12) (West 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2953.81(A) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1372 (West 2003). These sorts of 
provisions will not be discussed in depth here because this paper focuses on substance and 
procedures of postconviction DNA testing provisions. Statutes regarding the retention of 
biological evidence will be discussed to the extent they are relevant to this topic. 
78 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(j)(2) (West 2010). 
79 Id. 
80 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (j)(3)(i). The court is only required to hold a hearing as to the 
existence of such evidence when there is a genuine factual dispute as to whether or not the 
evidence still exists. Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 507, 929 A.2d 501, 510 (2007). 
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result of intentional and willful destruction, the court must order a 
postconviction hearing and the postconviction court must infer that the 
results of the test would have been favorable to petitioner. 81 
If the State wishes to dispose of evidence holding potential scientific 
value prior to the expiration of the time period it is required to be kept, 
they must notify the individual incarcerated, his or her attorney of record, 
and the Office of the Public Defender.82 The notice must include a 
description of the evidence, the intentions of the State to dispose of the 
evidence, unless an objection is filed in writing, and the name and 
location of the circuit court where an objection may be filed. 83 The 
individual has 120 days from the date of service to file an objection to 
destruction of the evidence in the appropriate circuit court. 84 The State 
may subsequently dispose of the evidence if no objection is filed. 85 If an 
objection is timely filed, the court must hold a hearing on whether or not 
the evidence may be destroyed.86 The court may order the destruction of 
the evidence if it determines, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the 
evidence lacks any significant forensic value87 or that the evidence cannot 
be practically retained by a law enforcement agency due to a physical 
characteristic.88 If destruction is requested due to a physical characteristic 
of the evidence, the court must order that the party opposing destruction 
be given an opportunity to obtain samples of the evidence prior to its 
destruction.89 The samples of evidence must be collected by a qualified 
crime scene technician.90 Further, an aggrieved party may appeal an 
order made pursuant to section 8-201 to the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland.91 
81 CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(j)(3)(ii). When a postconviction hearing is granted in this 
instance, the petitioner would likely need to establish that the judgment violated either the 
Federal or Maryland Constitution or that the sentence is subject to collateral attack. See CRIM. 
PROC. § 7-102(a)(I), (a)(4). 
82 § 8-201(k)(I); Horton, 412 Md. at 5, 985 A.2d at 542. 
83 CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(k)(2). 
84 ld. 
85 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(3). 
86 CRIM. PROe. § 8-201(k)(4). 
87 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(4)(i). 
88 CRIM. PRoe. § 8-201(k)(4)(ii). Characteristics of size and bulk are enumerated in the 
statute, but these would not presumably be the only properties of evidence that could fit this 
portion of the statute. The probability of evidence needed to be discarded under this portion 
of the statute is not likely to apply as DNA evidence will most likely be found on relatively 
small tangible items. 
89 ld. 
90 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(5). 
91 CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(k)(6). 
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F. Retroactive Application 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has stated that amendments to 
section 8-201 are to be applied retroactively.92 Maryland courts are not 
bound by language contained in previous versions of section 8-201 once 
new language becomes effective, despite the fact that the appeal may 
have been filed at the time when previous language was in effect. 93 Such 
retrospective application of a statute is an exception to the general rule 
that most new statutes are strictly applied prospectively and the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland listed several reasons for applying the 
Postconviction DNA Relief statute in such a way.94 First, the statute is 
merely a procedural change rather than the alteration of a substantive 
right. 95 Second, the legislature intended the statute to have a remedial 
effect for persons who are wrongfully convicted.96 New laws applying to 
procedural changes do not carry a presumption of operating 
prospectively, and the statute is designed to remedy past cases of injustice 
where a person was convicted of a crime they did not commit.97 
Consider a situation where Jeffrey was convicted for the murder of 
Kimberly and wishes to utilize section 8-201 twenty-five years later in an 
attempt to prove his actual innocence. Without an allowance in cases like 
Jeffrey's, an entire class of convicts98 would not be able to benefit from 
the new law, despite the fact that they are the group that has the most to 
gain.99 Because these petitioners were convicted before the 
postconviction DNA statute became effective, and before DNA testing 
and other forensic technologies became widely used, such convictions, 
from the outset, are the ones that are the most suspect. 
III. POSTCONVICTION DNA RELIEF IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS 
Forty-eight states, the District of Columbia, and the federal 
government have statutes allowing a petitioner to make a motion for 
DNA testing of biological evidence.lOo Both substantive and procedural 
92 Thompson v. State, 411 Md. 664,667,985 A.2d 32, 33-34 (2009); Gregg v. State, 409 
Md. 698, 714-15, 976 A.2d 999,1008-09 (2009). 
93 Gregg, 409 Md. at 714-18, 967 A.2d at 1008-10. 
94 ld. at 714-15, 976 A.2d at 1008-09. 
95 ld. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008. 
96 Jd. at 715, 976 A.2d at 1008-09. 
97 Jd. 
98 The class of convicts refers to those incarcerated prior to the enactment of the 
postconviction DNA testing statute. 
99 Consider this class of inmates referenced in the text to those who were convicted prior 
to the widespread use of DNA evidence in the courtroom. 
100 The only two states which do not have post-conviction DNA relief statutes are 
Massachusetts and Oklahoma. Access to Post-Conviction DNA Testing, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
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rules for obtaining relief through postconviction DNA testing vary 
significantly by jurisdiction. State rules have increased in their 
importance to those seeking relief, as the Supreme Court has made it 
clear that it does not intend to create any constitutional right to 
postconviction DNA testing. 101 Therefore, the various procedural and 
substantive rules enumerated in postconviction DNA relief statutes have 
become imperative, as federal courts will not intervene by overruling 
decisions made by state courts of last resort. 102 It is the policy of the 
federal courts, except in the case of a "truly persuasive demonstration of 
actual innocence," to not grant any form of federal habeas corpus relief 
and respect the state court judgment.103 
A. Standard to Obtain Court Ordered DNA Testing 
There exist a number of slightly varying standards specifically 
outlining what a petitioner must allege the results of testing will show. 
These standards can generally be categorized into two groups. The first 
group requires that a test result favorable to the petitioner show a 
reasonable probability of a different trial verdict. 104 The second group 
requires that the petitioner allege that a favorable test result would be 
materially relevant to a claim of actual innocence or, worded 
alternatively, a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief. 105 Still others 
require that the petitioner allege DNA testing will prove their innocence 
beyond all doubt. 106 
http://www.innocenceproject.org/ContentiAccess_To _ PostConviction _DNA _ Testing.php 
(last visited Oct. 12, 2011). 
101 See Dist. Attorney's Office v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2322, 2316 (2009) (resting on 
the conclusion that there is no substantive due process right to obtain access to State's 
evidence for testing). However, the Court made it clear that creating a due process right in the 
area of postconviction DNA testing would be unwise because it would essentially preclude 
state legislatures from creating their own rules in this developing area of criminal procedure. 
Id. at 2322. 
102 See id. 
103 House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518, 554 (2006) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 
417 (1993) (internal quotations omitted». 
104 E.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(c)(l) (West 2009); IOWA CODE ANN. § 
81.l0(7)(e) (West 2009); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(b) (2007). Maryland has also adopted 
this standard. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(c) (West 2009); see also supra note 
26 and accompanying text. 
105 E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(6)(B) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
I 12-202(6)(B) (2006); COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413(a) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
II, § 4504(a)(5) (West 2007); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 51116-3(c)(1) (West 2008) (stating 
that there is no requirement to allege that testing would completely exonerate petitioner); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(la)(c)(2) (West Supp. 2008). 
106 ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(8)(B) (2006): COL. REv STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413(1)(a) 
(West 2004) (stating that a court shall not order relief DNA testing unless petitioner shows by 
a preponderance of the evidence that favorable test results will demonstrate actual 
innocence)( emphasis added). 
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B. Standards of What DNA Testing Results Must Yield to For Petitioners 
to be Entitled to Relief 
Jurisdictions vary widely on what DNA test results must show so that 
a petitioner can be granted relief. At the very minimum, the results must 
show enough doubt as to the validity of a conviction to warrant further 
inquiry. Many jurisdictions require that, in light of the testing, it is 
"reasonably probable" that the petitioner would not have been convicted 
if such DNA test results were available at trial. 107 One rule mandates that 
when the results are favorable to the petitioner the court may take any 
action it deems to be appropriate under the circumstances, including 
sending the case to postconviction, granting a new trial, or even vacating 
the judgment of conviction and releasing the petitioner. 108 Another rule 
states that, in a hearing after testing is completed, a court may order any 
appropriate relief if the petitioner appears to be innocent in light of all of 
evidence available. 109 In some jurisdictions, the petitioner must show 
compelling evidence that a new trial would result in an acquittal. 110 
C. Application of Statute to Different Crimes 
Jurisdictions vary considerably as to the crime or crimes a petitioner 
must have been convicted of in order to be eligible for postconviction 
DNA relief. At one end of the spectrum, two states allow for DNA 
testing only in death penalty cases. IliOn the other end, many 
jurisdictions allow a petitioner to request DNA testing after being 
convicted of any felony. I 12 Generally, most jurisdictions place no 
107 E.g., Tx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. § 64.04 (West 2006). 
108 E.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3S-38-7-1 (LexisNexis supp. 2008); see also KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 21-2S12(f)(2)(B) (2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § ISA-270(c) (2007). 
109 DEL. CODE ANN. tit., II § 4S04(b) (West 2007). Due to the difficulty of proving a 
negative, namely, that a petitioner did not commit the crime for which he was convicted, a 
clear and convincing showing of innocence is likely lowest possible standard of proof 
acceptable to serve justice to those wrongly convicted and serve the interest of the state in 
keeping those who are guilty in prison. However, the Delaware standard defeats its own 
purpose because it first requires that a petitioner demonstrate that no trier of fact could find 
them guilty, and then sends the case to be decided by a new trier of fact. 
110 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(g)(2) (West Supp. 2010); People v. Starks, 8S0 N.E.2d 206, 212 
(Ill. App. 2006) (evidence must be so conclusive that it would probably change the result of 
the trial). 
III The two states allowing for postconviction DNA testing only in death penalty cases 
are Kentucky and Nevada. Ky. REv. STAT. Al\'N. § 422.285 (West Supp. 2008); NEV. REV. 
STAT. ANN. §§ 176.0918-.0919 (LexisNexis 2009). 
112 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 140S (West Supp. 2009); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 925.11 
(West Supp. 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 5-S-41(c) (West 2011) (stating that relief is limited to 
serious violent felonies as defined in § 17-10-6.1); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.\0(1) (West 2009); 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 29S3.72(C)(I)(a) (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-9-301 (West 
2008). 
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significant limitation on the type of crime for which the petitioner must 
have been found guilty. 113 
D. Right to Counsel 
A minority of jurisdictions provide a compulsory right to counsel. 114 
In most jurisdictions the right to counsel provision is triggered upon some 
preliminary showing by the petitioner of entitlement to relief. 115 At this 
time, the Maryland Rules require an appointment of counsel to the 
petitioner if the petitioner is indigent and if the motion is not denied as a 
matter of law. 116 It appears that the appointment of counsel provision 
may have been written in reaction to the cases where a petitioner stood a 
chance of success, but genuinely required the assistance of counsel to 
further aid the petitioning and hearing process. I 17 
E. Testing Must Not Have Been Available To the Petitioner Prior to 
Conviction 
Many jurisdictions require that the ability to test DNA evidence be 
contingent upon the availability to test during the time prior to conviction, 
and the failure on the part of the petitioner to utilize such testing, without 
compelling justification, constitutes a waiver of the right to make a 
postconviction challenge for potentially exculpatory DNA testing. 118 
113 See, e.g., 18 V.S.c.A. § 3600(a) (West Supp. 2010) (crimes of imprisonment or death); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 (2006); COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-413 (West 2004); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(a) (West 2009) (addressing crimes of incarceration); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. II, § 4504 (2007); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/116-3 (West 2008); MINN. STAT. 
ANN. § 590.01 (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (West 2007); TEX. CODE 
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01 (West 2006). While these jurisdictions may theoretically allow 
for testing after conviction for any crime, convictions for less serious crimes are far less likely 
to get to the point where postconviction DNA testing becomes an issue because: (I) DNA 
evidence simply will not be collected given the circumstances of the crime; (2) the existence 
or nonexistence of forensic evidence is not relevant to the investigation; and (3) the petitioner 
would be released from custody before any potential DNA testing would be completed 
making any petition for DNA testing a moot point, assuming the statute requires incarceration 
as a requirement to file a petition. 
114 See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(11) (West 2009) (stating that counsel be appointed 
upon filing the motion for relief when petitioner claims he or she is indigent). 
115 E.g., COL. REV. STAT. Ann. § 18-1-412(2)-(4) (West 2004) (stating that counsel be 
appointed by court upon a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief if defendant is 
indigent); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-102kk(e) (West 2009) (counsel appointed by 
court if indigent); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269 (West 2007) (stating that there be a counsel 
appointment by court upon a showing that DNA testing may be material to relief and 
indigence); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(c) (West 2006) (stating that counsel be 
appointed upon finding of reasonable grounds for motion to be filed and indigence). 
116 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 37-42 and accompanying text. 
118 E.g., 18 V.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(3)(A) (West. Supp. 2010); see also COL. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 18-1-413(1)(C)(Il) (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)(2) (West 2007); 725 ILL. 
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Other jurisdictions only require that the DNA itself, while possibly 
available for testing, was, for whatever reason, not tested. I 19 Provisions 
such as these prevent the petitioner from strategically not having relevant 
biological evidence tested, and subsequently claiming they have the right 
to test such evidence in an attempt to develop facts that could have been 
available at trial. Additionally, statutes in several jurisdictions allow for 
further DNA testing to be performed only upon a showing that the 
availability of newer technology has a substantial likelihood of being 
more probative than the methods used in previous tests. 120 Allowing 
petitioners to file subsequent motions for DNA testing satisfies the 
purpose underlying Maryland Code section 8-201 by not restricting a 
petitioner to a single petition in the hope that science has advanced far 
enough to potentially provide relief. Supplementary testing might be 
done if a new method of DNA testing is accepted by the courts, or if the 
petitioner can demonstrate that, for whatever reason, the results of prior 
tests can be shown to have been unreliable. 
F. Identity Issue Must Have Been Raised In Prior Proceedings 
Several jurisdictions require that the identity of the perpetrator be 
disputed at some point in the prior proceedings. 121 While the rule may 
initially appear idiosyncratic, its purpose is to keep petitioners from 
generating new factual issues as a bridge to possible avenues of relief that 
were not previously argued. Such a requirement prevents a situation 
where a petitioner argued an affirmative defense such as consent or self-
defense. Admitting involvement in the act, but merely denying that a 
crime was committed, makes DNA testing a moot point. 
G. Time Limitations for Filing Petition 
A minority of jurisdictions also impose a time limitation, typically two 
to three years, for a petitioner to file a motion for postconviction DNA 
testing. 122 The majority rule, however, is to impose no time restraint in 
COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/l16-3(a)(I) (West 2008); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.0I(la)(2) (West Supp. 
2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.01(b)(l)(a)(i) (West 2006). 
119 E.g., ALA. CODE § 15-18-200(c)(2)(West 2011). 
120 E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(3)(8) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-
112-202(10)(8)(iii) (2006); 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. 5/1 I 6-3 (a)(2) (West 2008); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 590.0I(la)(2) (West Supp. 2008); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-269(a)(3)(8) (West 
2007). 
121 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(7) (West Supp. 2010); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-
202(10)(8)(iii) (2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4504(a)(3) (West 2007); 725 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(b)(1) (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.1O(7)(c) (West 2009); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 590.01(la)(b)(l) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
64.03(a)(l)(8) (West 2006). 
122 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(lO)(A) (West Supp. 2010) (stating that a motion may be 
brought at any time within five years of enactment of the Justice for All Act or within three 
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any form on a petition for testing of DNA evidence. I23 There is currently 
no requirement in Maryland that the petition be filed within any particular 
amount of time. 124 
H. Requirement of a Chain of Custody 
Nearly all jurisdictions require that any biological evidence to be 
tested have a proper chain of custody sufficient to ensure that it was not 
tampered with or materially altered. 125 The purpose is to ensure the 
reliability of evidence. 126 The reason for requiring a sufficient chain of 
custody in a postconviction DNA petition is essentially the same. 
Without a minimal showing that the evidence now being subjected to 
DNA testing is reliable, petitioners may skirt the system when they 
demand testing after evidence was somehow tampered with 127, a potential 
problem that a proper chain of custody is designed to combat. 128 
years of conviction); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202(1O)(A) (2006) (stating that there is 
rebuttable presumption of timeliness within 36 months); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a) 
(West 2007) (motion must be filed within three years "after the judgment of conviction is 
final"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2137 (West 2008) (stating that a motion must be filed 
within two years of conviction or within two years of the discovery of new technology); 
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(4)(a) (West Supp. 2008) (stating that a motion must be filed 
within two years unless evidence could not have reasonably been discovered within the 
required timeframe). 
123 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 18-1-412 to 413 (West 2004); see also 725 ILL. COMPo 
STAT. ANN. 5/II6-3 (West 2008); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2009); MD. CODE ANN., 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009) (no limitation listed); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 
64.01-64.05 (West 2006). 
124 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009). Because DNA 
evidence has the capability of proving innocence decades after a crime occurred, there is no 
compelling reason to deny testing merely because a long time has passed. However, given the 
current climate in the criminal justice system where forensic evidence can be a crucial part of 
a case, the number of cases where the possibility that new DNA evidence will be uncovered 
that may establish innocence will certainly diminish in the years to come as both prosecutors 
and defense attorneys will try to seek out this evidence that could prove dispositive of guilt or 
innocence in several instances. The Court of Appeals has also rejected a laches argument 
presented by the state. Gregg V. State, 409 Md. 698, 716-17, 976 A.2d 999, 1009 (2009). 
125 E.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600 (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-
202(4) (West 2006) (requiring that the evidence remain in the possession of the State with 
proper chain of custody); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504(a)(4) (West 2007); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 19-4902(c)(I) (West 2004); 725 ILL. COMPo STAT. ANN. 5/116-3(b)(2) (West 2008) 
(requiring a prima facie proof of no tampering); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10(7)(b) (West 2009); 
ME. REv. STAT. tit. 15, § 2l38(4)(8) (West 2008) (requiring prima facie evidence of sufficient 
chain of custody); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 590.01(lb)(2) (West Supp. 2008); TEX. CODE CRIM. 
PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a)(I)(A)(ii) (West 2006). Maryland's statute does not have any chain 
of custody requirement. See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009). 
126 Thompson V. State, 80 Md. App. 676, 683, 566 A.2d 126, l30 (2010). 
127 7 A MD LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, CRIMINAL LAW, § l38 (Robert F. Koets et al. eds., 2000). 
128 Jd. 
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1. Challenging a Conviction Based on a Plea Agreement 
Jurisdictions are sharply divided over whether petitioners who pled 
guilty still retain the privilege to make postconviction motions for DNA 
testing. 129 Several jurisdictions explicitly allow, via statute or case law, a 
petitioner who pled guilty to make a motion for relief. 130 A minority of 
jurisdictions do not permit a court to grant a motion for DNA testing if 
the conviction stemmed from a guilty plea. 13l Courts in most 
jurisdictions still have not had an opportunity to decide whether a guilty 
plea bars a petitioner from seeking relief. 132 
J Miscellaneous Provisions 
Two other rules utilized in a few jurisdictions are worth discussion. 
At least one state and the federal government require that the theory or 
theories of innocence enumerated in a petitioner's motion cannot be 
inconsistent with a defense presented at trial. 133 Three jurisdictions, 
including the federal government, also require that the petitioner sign an 
affidavit of actual innocence. 134 A few jurisdictions require that the 
petitioner still be incarcerated to apply for relief. 135 
IV. WEAKNESSES IN MARYLAND'S STATUTE AND SUGGESTIONS FOR 
CHANGE 
The extraordinary feature of DNA is that it can exonerate individuals 
who were wrongfully convicted. 136 With that in mind, the end result of 
129 See JH Dingfelder Stone, Facing the Uncomfortable Truth: The Illogic of Post-
Conviction DNA Testingfor Individuals Who Pleaded Guilty, 45 U.S.F.L. REv. 47, 50-51 n. 
18-20 (2010) (discussing the merits of allowing offenders to challenge, through 
postconviction DNA testing, convictions to which they pled guilty). 
130 E.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1405(e) (West 2009); see also D.C. CODE § 22-4133(b)(4) 
(2009); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 844D-123(a)(l) (West 2009); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-
4202(d) (West 2004); Mo. REv. STAT. § 547.035 (West 2002) (as interpreted in Weeks v. 
State, 140 S.W.3d 39, 46 (Mo. 2004)); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(b) (West 
2006) (stating that identity must be an issue). 
131 E.g., 725 ILL. CaMP. STAT. ANN. § 51116-3 (West 2008) (as interpreted in People v. 
O'Connell, 879 N.E.2d 315,319 (Ill. 2007)); see also OHIO REV. CODE. ANN. § 2953.72(C)(2) 
(West 2010). 
132 See 18 U.S.c.A. § 3600 (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-112-202 
(West 2006); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-413 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. II, § 4504 
(West 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 81.10 (West 2009). 
I33 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(6)(A) (West Supp. 2010); see also ARK. CODE ANN. § 16 112-
202(6)(A) (West 2006) (excluding instances where the petitioner put forth an affirmative 
defense at trial). 
134 18 U.S.C.A. § 3600(a)(I) (West Supp. 2010); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
269(b)(3) (2007); TEX. CODE CRlM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.0 1 (a) (West 2006). 
135 E.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1-412(a) (West 2004); see also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
54-102kk(a) (West 2009). 
136 FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 2. 
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Maryland's statute should be limited to freeing individuals who are in 
prison for crimes they can prove to a virtual certainty they did not 
commit. 137 The key goals the legislature should strive to reach are: (1) 
freeing inmates who were wrongfully convicted after a trial as quickly 
and efficiently as possible; (2) eliminating instances where a factually 
guilty inmate could be released from incarceration; and (3) providing 
greater access to DNA evidence and greater scrutiny of cases that appear 
to be meritorious. Petitions should not be granted in instances where 
innocence is possible, but ultimately incapable of being proven to any 
sort of substantial certainty. 
A. The Standard Should be Changed Regarding what the Petitioner Must 
Allege DNA Testing Will Show 
Maryland's statute currently states that a court shall order testing if a 
petitioner can establish a reasonable probability that such testing will 
produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence relevant to wrongful 
conviction or sentencing. 138 The statute currently allows for review upon 
an allegation that testing has the potential to reveal "exculpatory or 
mitigating evidence relevant to a claim of wrongful conviction or 
sentencing.,,139 Such a standard should be changed to reflect what DNA 
testing is capable of, namely, establishing identity, and only permit a 
court to order review upon an allegation that testing will reveal 
exculpatory evidence relating only to a wrongful conviction. 
The value of DNA evidence lies in its power to identify individuals in 
ways that other forms of evidence cannot. The possibility of DNA 
evidence uncovering and eventually proving facts sufficient to mitigate 
an improper sentence is simply too unlikely to be allowed. Essentially, 
what a petitioner would be trying to accomplish is speculation of facts 
that are almost impossible to prove through DNA testing, and are only 
properly raised and argued at trial. Furthermore, prior to any motion for 
review of DNA evidence, petitioners have multiple opportunities to argue 
that any sentence they received was excessive or unconstitutional. A 
petitioner may take advantage of making the proper sentencing arguments 
137 Notwithstanding the difficulty of proving a negative, after a trial in which the 
petitioner was convicted, the burden of proof must necessarily shift from the State to the 
petitioner to prove a miscarriage of justice occurred. The high burden of proving one's 
innocence shifts as the State has already fulfilled their burden of proving the petitioner guilty 
beyond all reasonable doubt. Having them prove the petitioner's guilt again, simply because 
some doubt has arisen, is patently inequitable. 
138 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (d)(l)(i) (West 2009). 
139 ld. There also appears to be an internal discrepancy within section 8-201. Compare 
CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b)(1) (where a petition may only be filed to challenge a judgment of 
conviction), with § 8-201 (d) (where DNA testing may be ordered if a court finds the scientific 
potential exists to correct an error in conviction or sentencing). 
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during the sentencing phase of the trial,140 sentence review by a panel of 
circuit court judges, 141 by filing a motion for modification or reduction of 
sentence,142 through the direct appeal process,143 and during other 
postconviction proceedings. 144 
Accordingly, the statute should be reworded to eliminate any 
possibility that DNA testing could be ordered for the sole reason of 
mitigating a sentence. A petitioner's recourse for an incorrect sentence, 
in the postconviction DNA testing context, should be limited to the event 
of a grant of a motion for DNA testing and the establishment of actual 
innocence by a test, thus rendering moot any possibility that a sentence 
was Improper. 
B. The Standard Should be Changed for What the Result of DNA Testing 
Must Show for a Petitioner to be Awarded Relief 
As the statute is written, a petitioner is entitled to relief if the results of 
the DNA test ordered by a court are "favorable to the petitioner.,,145 The 
end result of any DNA relief statute should be only to release petitioners 
who are able to meet the high burden of substantially establishing actual 
innocence. Section 8-201 petitions should not be available to inmates 
who are only able to establish a mere possibility that they are not guilty of 
the crime for which a jury convicted them. If the testing ordered by the 
court is inconclusive, while "favorable" to the petitioner, there should be 
no remedy available. There should also be no remedy available in 
situations where DNA testing shows that the petitioner is "probably" 
innocent. Once the veil of the presumption of innocence dissipates, 
petitioners attempting to prove they were wrongfully convicted should be 
compelled to show that a reasonable person would not only see that they 
~~~~~~a~oo~~oo~~~~~~ 
convinced of factual innocence. 
In light of this proposed standard, new trials should not be granted. It 
is also difficult to see what real purpose a postconviction hearing serves 
when DNA evidence shows that a man in prison did not commit the 
140 See Jennings v. State, 339 Md. 675, 683, 664 A.2d 903, 907 (1995) (stating that trial 
courts have nearly unfettered discretion in the information they may consider in reaching the 
proper sentence); Smith v. State, 308 Md. 162, 167,517 A.2d 1081, 1084 (1986) (stating that 
a defendant's sentence should fit the offender and not merely the crime). 
141 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-102 (West 2009) (stating that the defendant must be 
sentenced by a circuit court to two or more years in prison). 
142 MD. R. 4-345(e). 
143 MD. R. 8-201; MD. R. 8-202. 
144 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 7-102(a)(I) (West 2011). The defendant would most 
likely make an allegation that their sentence violates the Constitution of the United States or 
the Constitution or laws of the State of Maryland. 
145 See CRIM. PROC. § 8-20 1 (i)(2). 
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crime for which he was convicted. All that should be necessary is a 
single streamlined process where a judge first determines if DNA testing 
is warranted, and then another hearing by the same judge to determine if 
testing shows that the petitioner is factually innocent, a determination 
from which either party involved may appeal. Of course, a petitioner 
should be left free to file another motion under section 8-201 if future 
technological advancements may yield more conclusive results. 
Any standard for entitlement to relief will have its shortcomings when 
viewed in terms of who it does and does not benefit. However, at the 
postconviction stage, the presumption of innocence does not exist. 146 The 
postconviction DNA petition should not be pennitted for anything other 
than substantially proving one's actual innocence. While it is an 
unfortunate fact that innocent people are in prison for crimes they did not 
commit, if those petitioners are not able to prove their innocence, and are 
only able to show their probable innocence, they should be forced to find 
another avenue for relief. 
C. The Statute Should Be Expanded to Include Relief for More Crimes 
While the number of successful section 8-201 petitions for crimes 
other than homicide and rape will likely only amount to a minimal 
percentage of exonerations, the option should be available to those 
petitioners who are serving lengthy prison sentences for crimes they may 
not be guilty of committing. In many cases, this may be the last option 
for a factually innocent petitioner looking for relief if their case has 
slipped through the cracks at the trial and appellate levels. Where there 
exists the possibility that a petitioner could prove their innocence, 
postconviction DNA testing should be allowed so long as testing would 
be probative to proving one's innocence. 
Maryland currently only affords the possibility of relief to petitioners 
who are convicted of various degrees of murder, manslaughter, or sex 
offenses. 147 Conversely, while petitioners are only entitled to relief for 
those few enumerated crimes, Maryland prosecutors are not bound in any 
way from using DNA evidence at trial no matter what crime or crimes for 
which the defendant has been charged. 148 In theory, a Maryland 
prosecutor could obtain a conviction for burglary where DNA evidence 
was used to establish that the defendant was inside the home, but the 
146 See He"era, 506 U.S. at 399 (holding that the presumption of innocence disappears if 
the defendant has been convicted after a fair trial); see also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 
317 (2002) (holding that after a defendant is found guilty by a jury he no longer enjoys a 
presumption of innocence). 
147 See supra Part Il.A, notes 18-20 and accompanying text. 
148 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-915(c) (West 2009) (stating that DNA 
evidence is admissible in any criminal proceeding). 
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defendant could not later come back and file a petition for postconviction 
DNA testing to argue that a newer form of DNA testing will show that 
the first test was mistaken. This is an inherent and fundamental flaw in 
Maryland's postconviction DNA statute that is wholly inequitable to the 
end goal of serving justice. 
Maryland should strongly consider entertaining petitions for DNA 
testing upon conviction for more felonies and crimes punishable by at 
least one year in prison. Whiie some states offer the possibility of relief 
for any felonyl49, Maryland should expand the statute by specifically 
enumerating more offenses for which review may prove someone's 
innocence, the rationale being that there are several types of crimes for 
which DNA evidence will not be analyzed. For example, there is simply 
no reason to entertain petitions for convictions of various types of 
fraud l50, crimes against public administration151 , and gaming 
violations. 152 For such crimes, the probability of DNA evidence even 
being collected and/or being material justifies them not being included in 
the statute. 153 It may be wise, however, for the Maryland Legislature to 
include a provision, in section 8-201(b), where a judge may entertain a 
postconviction DNA petition for a crime not included in the list upon a 
special finding that DNA testing may prove to be exculpatory. 
The Maryland Legislature should strongly consider expanding the 
Postconviction DNA Relief statute to include possible relief for crimes 
not originally included. Most crimes against persons including attempted 
149 See supra Part III.B, note 112 and accompanying text. 
150 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW §§ 8-103 to 108 (West 2009) (referencing bad check 
crimes); see also CRIM. LAW §§ 8-203 to 210 (referencing credit card crimes); CRIM. LAW §§ 
8-301 to 305 (referencing identity theft crimes); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-401 to 408 (referencing other 
forms of commercial fraud); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-503 to 505 (referencing public assistance 
frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-509 to 515 (referencing Medicaid frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-520 to 
523 (referencing other public frauds); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-601 to 613 (referencing counterfeiting 
and related crimes); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-701 to 702 (referencing crimes against estates); CRIM. 
LAW § 8-801 (referencing financial crimes against vulnerable adults); CRIM. LAW §§ 8-901 to 
905 (referencing miscellaneous frauds). 
151 See CRIM. LAW §§ 9-101 to 102 (regarding perjury); see also CRIM. LAW §§ 9-201 to 
205 (regarding bribery); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-302 to 306 (regarding obstruction of justice); CRIM. 
LAW §§ 9-402 to 408 (regarding harboring and escape); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-412 to 417 
(regarding contraband in places of confinement); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-504 to 506 (regarding false 
statements); CRIM. LAW § 9-604 (regarding false alarm); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-702, 9-703 
(regarding sabotage); CRIM. LAW §§ 9-802 to 805 (regarding criminal gang offenses). 
152 SeeCRIM. LAW §§ 12-103,12-105,12-109 (regarding various gaming violations). 
153 The elements required to prove these crimes make DNA evidence simply not relevant. 
In the event that such DNA evidence was collected, any exculpatory value it might have 
would, in a best-case scenario, be so tenuous as to not justify relief. 
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murder154, assault155, various sex offenses 156, robbery 157, kidnapping158, 
and abuse,159 should be included because: (1) these crimes are more likely 
than others to be investigated promptly and thoroughly; and (2) forensic 
evidence could be easily used to tie the offender to the particular victim 
or to the scene of the crime. 
One potential argument against inclusion of these crimes is the interest 
of judicial economy, as many petitions filed for these "lesser" crimes will 
simply not have relevant forensic evidence to examine, due either to the 
facts of the case or because DNA and other forms of forensic evidence 
were not gathered for testing. Allowing such petitions could clog the 
court system to the detriment of other more meritorious petitions. The 
end result is patently unfair to petitioners who are wrongfully imprisoned, 
as they should have at their disposal all reasonable means to challenge the 
validity of their conviction. 
A situation may also arise where DNA evidence related to a crime of 
violence, for whatever reason, was not collected, potentially because: (1) 
police and prosecutors were certain they had enough evidence to convict 
their suspect; or (2) investigators knew of the chance that any possible 
DNA analysis may be exculpatory.160 Unfortunately, a petitioner filing a 
postconviction DNA motion will not have any success under these 
circumstances. One way to prevent this kind of potential abuse would be 
to permit a defendant, at trial, to argue that the police had the opportunity 
to collect and analyze biological evidence at a crime scene that may have 
indicated that the defendant did not commit the crime. The jury should 
then be permitted to infer that such evidence would have been 
eXCUlpatory. Such an argument could be permitted whether agents of the 
State deliberately chose not to collect scientific evidence for analysis or if 
such an error was merely an oversight. Even in the latter scenario, the 
defendant on trial is still potentially deprived of an opportunity to present 
an alternate theory ofthe crime. 
154 See CRIM. LAW §§ 2-205, 2-206. 
155 See CRIM. LAW §§ 3-202 to 204 (regarding assault in the first and second degree, and 
reckless endangennent) and § 3-210 (regarding assault by inmate). 
156 See CRIM. LAW § 3-307 (regarding sexual offense in the third degree); see also CRIM. 
LAW §§ 3-309 to 312 (regarding attempted rape and attempted sexual offense); CRlM. LAW § 
3-314 (regarding sexual conduct between correctional officer and inmate); CRIM. LAW § 3-315 
(regarding continuing course of conduct with child); CRIM. LAW § 3-321 (regarding sodomy). 
157 CRIM. LAW §§ 3-402, 3-403,3-405 (regarding carjacking). 
158 CRIM. LAW §§ 3-502, 3-503 (regarding kidnapping and child kidnapping). 
159 CRlM. LAW § 3-601 (regarding child abuse); see also CRIM. LAW § 3-602 (regarding the 
sexual abuse of a minor); CRIM. LAW §§ 3-604, 3-605 (regarding the abuse of vulnerable 
adults). 
160 Consider convictions based solely on, or through a combination of, eyewitness 
testimony, other fonns of physical evidence, and video or audio recordings that do not 
conclusively identify the defendant. 
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D. A Right to Counsel Upon an Initial Showing of Entitlement to Relief 
Should be Guaranteed 
One compelling reason to allow for a petitioner to have a right to 
counsel during postconviction proceedings and, if necessary, have 
counsel paid for by the State, is the complexity of the science behind 
DNA testing. This is especially true considering that petitioners must 
state which test they want to use and how it is generally accepted in the 
scientific community. 161 Also, assuming the petition contains a sufficient 
allegation warranting an answer by the State, the petitioner should be 
entitled to help in responding to the State's arguments and opposition. 
Although it would be ideal for a state to provide and pay for counsel 
as a matter of course when any petitioner wishes to seek assistance, the 
sheer number of potential petitions and the budgetary and manpower 
constraints on the Office of the Public Defender make providing counsel 
for all petitioners practically impossible.1 62 The issue then becomes 
when, exactly, should counsel be appointed for a petitioner to strike the 
proper balance between the legitimate interests of an inmate and the 
interests of the court systems and the State. As the law is written, the 
petitioner must survive dismissal as a matter of law. 163 Counsel is also 
appointed prior to the critical stages when the petitioner has the option of 
responding to the State's answer and filing an amended petition. 164 
Even without legal expertise, pro se petitioners do not have an 
especially difficult time successfully alleging the requirements for testing 
if their case is truly meritorious, as evidenced by the many reported 
opinions by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. 165 However, petitions 
may be dismissed for other technical reasons and possibly because the 
petitioner has not thought of every last location where exculpatory 
evidence may be located. Focusing attention on petitions that state a 
particularized prima facie case for relief, as well as meeting all other 
requirements, should adequately minimize the number of petitions filed, 
making it more manageable for the Office of the Public Defender. 
Requiring that a petitioner make his or her initial showing will strike a 
balance between an already overworked public defender system, and a 
petitioner's right to have the assistance of counsel for when scientifically 
complex or other difficult nuances of law become relevant. 
161 See MD. R. 4-704(a)(2)(C). 
162 See STATE OF MARYLAND OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC DEFENDER, FISCAL YEAR 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at http://www.opd.state.md.uslIndex%20Assets/Annual% 
20Report%20FY20 1 0%20fuldr5.pdf 
163 See MD. R. 4-707(a). 
164 See MD. R. 4-707(b). 
165 See Arey v. State, 400 Md. 491, 929 A.2d 501 (2007); see also Blake v. State, 395 Md. 
213, 909 A.2d 1020 (2006) (regarding Maryland cases filed pro se). 
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Even considering the above, minor changes are necessary that will 
further protect a petitioner's interests. My solution would be to have a 
right to counsel upon an allegation that, first, evidence exists and, second, 
that evidence, with the result being favorable to the petitioner would, 
third, tend to establish factual innocence. Upon satisfying those 
requirements, counsel should be appointed to aid the petitioner in their 
attempt to establish their actual innocence. Mere technical violations that 
cause a petition to be dismissed should not serve as grounds to prevent 
the filing of an additional petition. Furthermore, the appointment of 
counsel provision should be enacted in section 8-201 instead of the 
Maryland Rules. Finally, counsel should be appointed as soon as 
practicable after the State has filed an answer. There is no logic in a court 
waiting thirty days to assign counsel and the additional time that counsel 
has to review the State's answer will strengthen the quality of the petition 
and, hopefully, result in fewer postponements resulting from lack of time 
to prepare a response. 
E. There Should be a Requirement that Eligibility for Relief be Contingent 
Upon Identity Being Raised as an Issue at Trial 
Maryland's Postconviction DNA Statute does not impose any 
restrictions on who may be entitled to DNA testing based on previous 
proceedings at trial. I66 The goal of these suggested rules are threefold. 
First, they are designed to prevent a petitioner from raising new issues 
and alternate theories of the crime, which were not disputed or made an 
issue at trial. Second, the statutory scheme must be designed to keep 
inmates in prison unless the claim is truly meritorious and they may 
possibly prove themselves innocent by making their allegations of 
entitlement to relief consistent with arguments raised at trial. At some 
point, there must be reasonable limitations on what a petitioner can argue 
during postconviction proceedings. Third, such a rule saves the court's 
time by allowing a judge to summarily deny those petitions that will 
ultimately fail. 
Consider a situation in which Timothy was charged, in Maryland, with 
the first-degree rape of Mary. At trial, Timothy defended against the 
charges by claiming Mary consented. The jury, not believing Mary 
consented, convicted Timothy of the crime. Timothy then filed a motion 
under section 8-201 for DNA testing of biological evidence that, for the 
sake of argument, is material to the case. By electing to defend against 
the charge via his argument that the victim consented, Timothy admitted 
166 See generally MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (b) (West 2009). 
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sexual contact with the victim at or around the time of the alleged rape. 167 
Despite that fact, there is no provision in the statute barring Timothy from 
filing a motion for DNA testing. 168 To help eliminate such a quandary, 
Maryland should require, like many other states, that identity have been 
made an issue at some point during prior proceedings. 169 While no 
petitioner should be forced to allege mistaken identity as their only 
defense at trial, a petitioner should in all practicality argue that they were 
not the perpetrator. 
The benefit to be derived from DNA evidence arises from its ability to 
link biological evidence to an actual person. Petitions to review DNA 
evidence should not be used as a vehicle to reexamine factual issues 
surrounding the circumstances of crimes that are alleged to have been 
committed. Without a requirement that identity must have been made an 
issue during prior proceedings, a petitioner filing under section 8-201 
could attempt to re-litigate factual issues other than identity, for which the 
science behind DNA is simply not useful. 170 
F. A Provision Should be Created to Account for the Speed of Scientific 
Advancement 
The science behind DNA technology is still in its infancy. 171 Since the 
mid-1980s, a multitude of different tests 172 have been utilized by law 
enforcement agencies around the country, both to conclusively link 
suspects to criminal activity and also to clear suspects who may have 
otherwise been tried and convicted. 173 
Many states have enacted a provision that recognizes that the 
technology related to the DNA analysis of biological specimens is still 
evolving, and therefore allow for the filing of a new petition for a newer 
167 While only a legal admission for purposes of arguing the proffered defense, Timothy 
arguing on postconviction that he was not Mary's rapist is not very convincing in light of his 
arguments made at trial. 
168 Even if DNA testing revealed that the sample used against Timothy at trial was 
conclusively established as not being his, this fact should not warrant the reversal of 
conviction. Timothy admitted to the sexual contact and just because the DNA was not his 
does not erase the fact that the jury chose to disbelieve his version of events. 
169 See supra Part III.F, note 1202 and accompanying text. 
170 While a petition raising issues other than identity has at best a minimal chance of 
being successful, there is currently no limitation barring such a claim as long as the petition 
relates to DNA evidence. While a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief could be 
established in theory, such a petition would most likely be unsuccessful. 
171 See Unreliable or Improper Forensic Science, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www. 
innocenceproject.orgiunderstandlUmeliable-Limited-Science.php (last visited November 3, 
2011). 
172 The most widely used DNA testing methods are RFLP testing and peR testing. 
FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 26-28. 
173 FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE, supra note 6, at 2. 
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testing method that may be more probative than prior tests. 174 Provisions 
in these statutes that allow for further testing, to parallel the advancement 
of science, permit a petitioner to file potentially meritorious motions 
where prior testing was insufficient to develop a DNA profile capable of 
establishing exculpatory evidence. 175 Such a provision allows for a 
petitioner to make the same allegations, but have the evidence carrying 
potential forensic value retested using a different method of DNA testing 
which may yield more probative results. 
Imagine a situation where Christopher is serving a life sentence for a 
homicide committed during a home invasion. Evidence introduced at 
trial included a drop of blood at the crime scene that matched 
Christopher's blood type, was conclusively determined to not be the 
victim's, and was believed by the police to have belonged to the attacker. 
After the enactment of Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute in 
2003, Christopher petitioned to have the drop of blood tested for a DNA 
profile and agreed to provide a sample of his own DNA for comparison. 
Unfortunately, the crime lab that performed the test did not have a 
sufficient sample of cells to create a DNA profile of the blood drop from 
the crime scene. Accordingly, Christopher's motion for relief was 
denied. Now, Christopher wishes to have the same blood drop tested for 
DNA analysis for the same purpose using a more advanced form of DNA 
testing that requires less biological material than the previous testing 
method. A court may be tempted to deny Christopher's motion for 
testing given that prior testing did not warrant relief. The judge presiding 
over the hearing may erroneously conclude that the testing would not be 
any more probative than any other test that was previously conducted. 176 
A statutory provision allowing for a new type of test to be performed 
on genetic material, which could not be tested previously, protects against 
miscarriages of justice based solely on the fact that the motion, while 
meritorious, was simply filed before a test delivering meaningful results 
could be performed. Maryland, like other jurisdictions, should add a 
provision allowing a petitioner to have DNA evidence tested again. That 
provision should be conditioned on: (1) a sufficient showing that a newly 
developed method of testing would yield more probative results, or that 
prior testing utilizing the same method was for some reason unreliable; 
and (2) there is sufficient genetic material left for testing. The rapid 
174 See supra Part III.E, note 11920 and accompanying text. 
175 See id. 
176 While this is an extreme example, this and other analogous factual scenarios could 
occur. As of now there is nothing barring the filing of more than one motion under section 8-
201, but a difficult judge may still find as fact that no reasonable probability of the discovery 
of mitigating evidence exists. By finding as fact that the new test does not stand a better 
chance of producing results probative of innocence, a judge in his or her discretion could 
possibly block a meritorious petition that has a reasonable probability of being successful. 
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advancement of technology, and the fact that DNA can sometimes be 
tested decades after a sample was collected, also justifies states imposing 
no time restriction on how long after a conviction a motion for 
postconviction DNA testing may be filed. 177 
G. There Should be a Requirement that a Petitioner May Only File a 
Motion if They are Presently Incarcerated 
Interestingly enough, it is conceivable for an innocent person to be 
released from prison and still be eligible for exculpatory postconviction 
DNA testing under section 8_201. 178 Even after release, persons 
convicted of certain crimes in Maryland will have certain limitations on 
civil rights and liberties. 179 While some of the restrictions on those who 
have served time in prison are, in some cases, substantial, the statute 
should be designed to provide relief only to those who are having their 
most precious right taken away from them-freedom. Again, such a rule 
should be implemented to protect the courts from having to deal with a 
potentially limitless amount of motions that have, at best, only a minimal 
chance of being successful and will only provide a marginal amount of 
relief when compared to the relief of those petitions coming from those 
who are presently incarcerated. When weighing the value of freedom 
against the restoration of rights taken as a result of a criminal conviction, 
petitioners who are already free from incarceration should not be 
pennitted to file a petition in the interest of judicial economy. 
Furthermore, the volume of petitions coming from persons who are not 
incarcerated could end up eclipsing otherwise meritorious petitions from 
inmates whose convictions might seriously be questioned. 
The financial burden on all parties, when weighed against the potential 
relief by someone who is not even incarcerated, should also be 
considered. Substantial costs will be incurred by the Office of the Public 
177 See innocence Project Asks Virginia Appeals Court to Clear a Richmond Man Who 
Has Served Nearly 27 Years for Rapes He Didn't Commit, INNOCENCE PROJECT, 
http://www.innocenceproject.orgiContentJInnocence_Project_Asks _ Virginia_Appeals _Court_ 
to _ Clear_a _Richmond_Man_ Who_ Has_Served_Nearly_27 _ YearsJor _ Rapes_ He_Didnt_ Co 
mmit.php (last visited Sept. 29,2011). 
178 See MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) (West 2009) (containing no restriction as 
to who may apply for DNA testing of biological evidence. In theory a petitioner previously 
released from prison could conceivably file a motion for relief under this subsection up until 
the time of their death). 
179 See CRIM. PROC. §§ ll-70l to 727 (regarding sex offender registration); see also MD. 
CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 5-306(a)(2) (West 201l) (regarding persons convicted of felonies 
or misdemeanors for which they were sentenced to incarceration for one year or longer cannot 
own firearms); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 8-L03(b)(4) (West 2011) (regarding 
persons who received a sentence for a crime punishable by greater than six months 
incarceration are not qualified to serve on a jury). Apart from the legal consequences of 
having served time behind bars, the stigma of having a felony conviction may affect one's 
ability to find employment and strain other social relationships. 
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Defender in representing the petitionerl8o, the State's Attorney's Office in 
defending the conviction, and, finally, the court in both pecuniary terms 
and in the time it takes to hear the petition. 181 Furthermore, an individual 
who is not incarcerated and seeks postconviction relief because of 
significant collateral consequences stemming from the conviction may 
file a writ of coram nobis-a civil action challenging a judgment based 
on an error of fact. 182 
H. Relief Should Not be Allowed When the Petitioner Pled Guilty 
Maryland courts have yet to decide whether petitioners who pled 
guilty to crimes retain the right to make a motion for postconviction DNA 
testing, and the Maryland Legislature has either consciously left such a 
decision for the courts or has overlooked the possibility that such a 
situation might arise. 183 The argument against barring a motion is that the 
petitioner may have pled guilty on the advice of defense counsel who 
believed, with the State's evidence, that the petitioner would be convicted 
and sentenced to life in prison. Instead, defense counsel negotiated a plea 
arrangement with the State's Attorney handling the case in which the 
potential petitioner would serve a shorter sentence in prison. Acting on 
advice of counsel, the petitioner accepted the deal. 
On the other hand, plea bargains limit the effectiveness of 
postconviction DNA petitions in several ways. 184 To have DNA testing 
ordered in Maryland, a petitioner must show a reasonable probability that 
testing will produce exculpatory evidence. 185 Under most circumstances, 
the facts alleged in a petition for postconviction relief will necessarily, in 
part, be drawn from the trial record. 186 However, when there was a guilty 
plea, there is no detailed trial record, no witness testimony, and often 
there is only a minimal factual investigation on the part of the State and 
defense counsel. I87 Thus, both the defense's factual quest to establish 
180 This does assume that the petitioner is indigent and either unable or unwilling to hire 
private counsel. 
181 The substantial costs can be thought of in terms of manpower, time, etc. This also 
includes depriving the Office of the Public Defender of valuable time that could be spent on 
other petitions that have a greater chance of being successful, as well as other functions of the 
office. 
182 Skok v. State, 361 Md. 52, 78, 760 A.2d 647,661 (2000); see also MD. R. 15-1201 to 
1207. 
183 Courts in other jurisdictions have answered the question of whether a petitioner who 
pled guilty may later bring a motion to test DNA evidence from a crime scene. Unless the 
legislature makes a decision sometime in the near future, this issue stands a strong chance of 
being addressed by the Court of Appeals of Maryland. See Stone, supra note 129, at 50-51 n. 
18-19. 
184 Stone, supra note 129, at 56. 
185 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(d) (West 2009). 
186 Stone, supra note 129, at 57. 
187 Stone, supra note 129, at 56-57. 
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innocence as well as the State's attempt to refute innocence are hindered 
by the inherent gaps available in evidence in cases in which the petitioner 
pled guilty.188 Petitions stemming from a conviction following a guilty 
plea should thus be denied. 
/. Petitioner Should be Required to Allege a Sufficient Chain of Custody 
The Maryland legislature should enact a requirement that the 
petitioner show a chain of custody sufficient to demonstrate that the 
evidence to be tested has not been tampered with or otherwise 
compromised. While it would not be prudent to require an inmate to 
show a perfect chain of custody, requiring the petitioner to show a 
reasonable probability that no tampering occurred is manageable. 
Practically speaking, it will be very difficult for a defendant to prove 
beyond any doubt that evidence was not tampered with, principally 
because he is making an allegation about the present state of evidence not 
within his direct control. Also, establishing a reasonable probability is 
equivalent to the burden held by the State in proving its case. 189 
V. CONCLUSION 
Maryland's Postconviction DNA Relief Statute, as currently written, 
provides an avenue for those charged with the most violent crimes to 
prove their factual innocence. 190 The Maryland General Assembly should 
limit what petitioners seek to prove l91 , expedite claims that show merit l92, 
and create rules that would be helpful in quickly denying frivolous 
petitions and those which have no chance of success. 193 
By mandating that a petitioner must seek to prove actual innocence, 
the possibility that an inmate may seek only to establish that their 
sentence was improper, an end that analysis of DNA evidence is simply 
not able to accomplish, would be eliminated. 194 An argument that a 
petitioner wishes to show mitigating evidence relating to the crime they 
committed would also be preempted by such a change in the letter of the 
law. While arguments that relevant evidence other than DNA was not 
considered, or that a sentence is excessive in light of what a petitioner 
was convicted for, do have their place during the appellate and 
postconviction processes, those arguments have no place in a motion for 
188 Stone, supra note 129, at 57-58. 
189 Jones v. State, 172 Md. App. 444, 462, 915 A.2d 10 10, 1020-21 (2007). 
190 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201(b) (West 2009); see also supra text 
accompanying note 15. 
191 See supra Part IV.A. 
192 See supra Part IV.B. 
193 See supra Part IV. 
194 See supra Part lV.A. 
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DNA analysis simply because any result would not be sufficiently 
probative towards arguing those points. 195 
By extension, Maryland should reword the relief portion of the statute 
so that it mandates the denial of relief absent a showing of actual 
innocence. The statutory scheme should not be designed to provide relief 
after DNA testing reveals only a possibility that a petitioner is 
innocent. l96 The term "favorable" in the relief portion of the statute is a 
loosely defined term that could be stretched to the extreme end of 
awarding a new trial if DNA testing proves to be inconclusive. 197 
While an increased burden on the court system may result by 
expanding the list of offenses for which a petitioner is eligible for relief 
under section 8-201, the end result of providing greater access to justice 
is more thoroughly preserved. 198 Additionally, Assistant State's 
Attorneys are not restricted to using DNA evidence only for the 
prosecution of rapes and murders. 199 Logically speaking, and although 
the case will certainly be rare where a burglar is able to prove their 
innocence through the use of DNA evidence, inmates should have a 
means to test this evidence because it is equally probative in proving 
innocence as it is in proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. 200 
Requiring an inmate to have argued identity at some point during their 
trial for a section 8-20 I petition to be considered for review guarantees 
that they will only be seeking review about an issue that DNA testing has 
the capability to prove.201 Such a rule also helps to guarantee that a 
petitioner is not simply filing the motion in a long shot attempt to rai se an 
issue that likely was not previously mentioned, but also places a burden 
on the petitioner to, at minimum, make an argument that is not entirely 
different from a defense they were committed to establishing at tria1.202 
The technology of DNA testing is constantly evolving203 and DNA 
evidence can be preserved for decades after a crime occurS.204 In light of 
this, Maryland should amend to include a provision that allows for the 
195 MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 8-201 (West 2009); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 13 7 -142, 171 and accompanying text. 
196 See supra Part IV.B. 
197 See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
198 See supra Part IV.C. 
199 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1O-915(c) (West 2011); see also supra text 
accompanying note 148. 
200 MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 1O-915(c) (West 2011); see also supra text 
accompanying note 147 and accompanying text. 
201 See supra Part IV.E. 
202 See supra Part IV.E. 
203 See supra notes 171-73 and accompanying text. 
204 See supra note 177 and accompanying text. 
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retesting of DNA evidence under section 8-201 when a new fonn of 
testing may be more probative than the previous method of testing. 205 
While requiring that a petitioner be incarcerated will, in nearly all 
circumstances, be more of a fonnality than a bar to relief, such a rule is 
necessary for the expediency of the courts as well as limiting the 
litigation of issues when the time for review has simply come to pass.206 
Furthennore, people who are not in prison and wish to establish their 
factual innocence may file a writ of coram nobis, which would be more 
proper for someone who is not incarcerated.207 
Neither the legislature nor the Maryland courts have made any 
detennination about whether a petitioner may apply for relief under 
section 8-201 after pleading guilty.20S There are some compelling reasons 
to justify allowing petitioners who pled guilty to seek relief, however, 
there is also no way to definitively establish that DNA testing will be 
probative of a claim of innocence. Because it is most likely that neither 
side, after the plea agreement, attempted to develop any factual account 
of the crime, it is impossible in plea bargaining to detennine exactly what 
the presence or absence of DNA material from a crime scene actually 
means?09 
There is a chain of custody requirement for postconviction DNA relief 
in most jurisdictions, but Maryland has not yet enacted this 
requirement.2IO Accordingly, section 8-201 should be amended so that a 
defendant must establish, at the bare minimum, that the evidence was not 
tampered with or altered.211 
Maryland's statutory scheme governing postconviction DNA relief 
petitions is imperfect. Maryland should take certain cues from other 
jurisdictions and create rules designed to prevent miscarriages of justice. 
The Maryland Legislature, in the interest of expeditiously freeing those 
wrongfully convicted and keeping those who do not deserve their 
freedom behind bars, should amend section 8-201 as necessary to further 
the suggested goals of the statutory scheme.212 
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